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Abstract
From the epistemological posture that 
we present in this work we sustain the 
following thesis:
– That as subjects we constitute the
world we live in through one of the pos-
sible conceptual frameworks.
– Our cognitive and social practices
construct the world in a certain manner, 
which makes us responsible for the way 
this world is constituted.
The type of scientific and technological 
practices that cannot be corrected force 
us to consider that the ends/ objectives 
are definitive, since in fact, once started 
there is no going back. This, leads us to 
reflect that the advance of technology 
and its power is too advanced in relation 
to the knowledge that men have and also 
to their moral capacity to make the cor-
rect decisions keeping in mind the con-
ditions that future generations will live 
in. The risk is that human beings cannot 
know for certain what the bi-products/ 
sub-products of scientific-technologi-
cal-research will be, they cannot foresee 
exactly what the consequences derived 
from it will be.
Without the perspective that time 
gives us, on many occasions it is not clear 
if the effects are negative or not.  It may 
also be that the consequences turn out to 
be what was expected according to the 
scientific and technological objectives 
as envisioned. In this sense, they may be 
successful, but in the social, cultural and 
moral contexts the results may be con-
fusing, if not harmful, and exceed the ca-
pacity for research, deliberation and de-
cision making by the members of society.
The acquisition of knowledge has be-
come an urgent duty, but, seeing that the 
products of research remain submitted 
to the restrictions imposed by reality, in 
this case, conceptualized as entropy, it is 
necessary to accept that far from the sub-
jects having absolute dominion over the 
environment, our knowledge is partial 
and fallible and the second law of ther-
modynamics restricts our practices.
Key words
Pluralism, onto-epistemological, social 
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1. Introduction
According to the first law of thermo-
dynamics the total energy contained in 
the universe is constant and, agreeing 
to the second law the quantity of entro-
py tends to increase constantly in time. 
Corresponding to the law of conservation 
of energy, energy is neither created nor 
destroyed, we can only transform ener-
gy from one state to another. Entropy is 
a measurement of the quantity of ener-
gy that cannot possibly be transformed 
into work. If entropy increases then the 
energy disposable to be transformed into 
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work decreases. In fact, pollution is the 
sum of disposable energy that has been 
transformed into dissipated energy.
In a closed system, the difference in 
the levels of energy tends to equalize. For 
example, when a poker is removed from 
the fire and left in the open air, soon we 
notice that it begins to cool while the sur-
rounding air begins to heat up. This is be-
cause the heat flows from the hottest bod-
ies to the cooler ones. After some time the 
air and the poker reach the same temper-
ature.  The experts call this condition a 
‘state of equilibrium’, the state in which 
there are no differences in the levels of 
energy. The state of equilibrium is that 
in which entropy has reached its maxi-
mum level. That is, the level where there 
is no more energy available to carry out 
any additional work. Rudolf Clausius, 
the first physicist to coin the term ‘entro-
py’, concluded that this, understood as 
the quantity of energy not available for 
carrying out work, tends towards a max-
imum level. Many people believe that 
nearly everything we use can be recycled 
and reused if we develop the appropriate 
technology. But this is not so. Recycling 
requires additional energy to collect, 
transport and process the used materials, 
which increases the proportion of entro-
py in the environment. So that, materials 
can only be recycled thanks to the use of 
new resources of the available energy 
and at the price of increasing the entro-
py in the general environment. Let us 
not forget that entropy increases and will 
reach its maximum level. This is because 
the Earth is considered a closed system 
in relation to the universe, that is to say it 
exchanges energy but not the surround-
ing matter (Rifkin & Howard, 1980).
It could also be said that the maximum 
level of entropy in which the available 
energy has been dissipated is also the 
most disorderly state.  The state of mini-
mum entropy, in which there is the great-
est amount of energy available is also the 
most orderly.
The state of equilibrium only con-
cerns closed systems. Live systems can-
not reach a state of equilibrium because 
a state like this would mean death. Live 
beings use the surrounding energy avail-
able, this is called a ‘stationary state’. If 
the flow of matter and energy through a 
live organism stops, the stationary state 
is abandoned and the organism takes on 
the state of equilibrium.
So far we have that for an organism to 
exist it requires energy. The energy that a 
live being dissipates can only be replaced 
by its interaction with the environment 
which allows it to restore the useful ener-
gy that it lost. From now on, the term ‘en-
ergy’ will be understood as ‘useful ener-
gy’.  In general terms, energy can be used 
to generate work or to generate heat. The 
energy that is used to carry out work is 
called ‘useful energy’. From the energy 
that is used to generate heat, one part is 
useful and the other is dissipated, that 
is, it is lost. The energy that is dissipated 
goes to produce entropy. Not even an an-
imal in a state of lethargy can live indefi-
nitely off itself. Energy which is restored 
is related to energy wasted or dissipated. 
“Life would be impossible without an ac-
tive interaction between the living and 
the nature surrounding it.” (p.15) If there 
is a surplus of energy that the living being 
replaces, then there is growth. If there is 
an energy deficit, degeneration begins, 
and if this is constant it leads to death.
Living processes are liberated by the 
environment and the organism; these 
two integrate through their interactions. 
The environment of a moving animal dif-
fers from a sedentary plant, the environ-
ment of a fish differs from that of a bird. 
The difference does not consist in the fish 
living in the water and the bird in the air 
but that the characteristic functions of 
these animals are what they are because 
of the special way that water and air form 
part of their respective activities, as well 
as the availability of the food (useful en-
ergy) needed for them to live in one en-
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vironment or another according to their 
needs. (Dewey, 1950). Living beings sur-
vive when they are capable of re-estab-
lishing/ replacing useful energy of their 
environment. The struggle for existence 
depends on how well equipped each or-
ganism is to capture the useful energy 
available. (Rifkin & Howard, 1980).
A great number of living beings de-
pend on their anatomic capabilities to ob-
tain energy from the environment. Take 
plants, they live only by the sun’s energy 
whereby they absorb the inorganic nu-
trients into the organic matter. Although 
human beings also take in inorganic 
nutrients, minerals, for example, we do 
not survive only on that. Our interaction 
with our environment is more complex 
because we need a greater variety of 
foods in order to exist.  Also, throughout 
history, men and women have needed 
to construct tools and machinery to cap-
ture and transform the available energy. 
For example, men have built houses to 
capture heat and keep our bodies at an 
adequate temperature that allows us to 
subsist. At the same time we have devel-
oped forms of social organization related 
to certain meanings, languages, beliefs, 
knowledge, social practices, norms and 
values, thanks to which we have been 
able to survive as a species. This con-
struct of social and cultural organisations 
requires useful energy “Energy is the ba-
sis of culture, in the same way as it is the 
basis of life.” (p. 58).
We could say that energy is the basis 
of the constitution of different forms of 
life. Faced with the need for survival, dif-
ferent cultures have been constituted in 
relation to different surroundings, natu-
ral and social (tools, technology, etc.) re-
sources that the members of respective 
societies and cultures have used through-
out generations to replace the energy dis-
sipated and thereby survive.
The possibility of men and women 
surviving depends, to a great degree, on 
their knowledge of the context in which 
they live and their use of stable resourc-
es. From an epistemological posture, the 
construct of societies and cultures that 
constitute different conditions of exist-
ence, can be explained starting from the 
proposal of onto-epistemological plu-
ralism. This position is relevant to the 
subject of entropy and our interaction 
with the environment because, in the 
degree to which we construct the world 
we live in, we are also responsible for it. 
For example, if we consume more useful 
energy than the environment can pro-
vide – consider non-renewable resourc-
es – the missing difference will cause the 
environment to degenerate irreversibly. 
In addition, when our interactions with 
our surroundings are so intense that they 
start consuming more energy in a short-
er time than that needed to replace it – 
the case of renewable energies – the pro-
cess of degradation begins. The problem 
is, therefore, that energy resources are 
or become scarce in relation to the social 
practices we carry out.
 
2. Onto-epistemological plural-
ism and the constitution of dif-
ferent worlds.
Let us start from the basis that subjects 
structure the world or reality [1] through 
one of many conceptual frameworks. Con-
ceptual frameworks are social constructs 
that are constructed, sustained and trans-
formed as a result of the interactions of 
the subjects. These frameworks are con-
ditions of possibility to acquire concepts, 
beliefs, language, knowledge, norms and 
values that human beings need and use 
in our cognitive relationship with the 
world (Olivé, 1999). The facts and the ob-
jects that form part of a world only exist 
when we structure reality from a cer-
tain conceptual framework; the world in 
which the members of a community live 
depends epistemologically and ontologi-
203
© Nullius in verba EditorialScientia in verba subpage
/revista-scientia-in-verbapdf/
Gómez, M. 200-211
cally on these frameworks.  So that, those 
subjects who structure a reality from a 
different conceptual framework under-
stand the world in another way, but they 
also live in another world.
According to Kuhn, the conceptual 
frameworks provide the limits to the be-
liefs that it is possible to conceive (Kuhn, 
2000). These frameworks are constructed 
and transformed by the subjects in their 
social practices, so that when the new 
generations are born they find them-
selves in a world with the subjects that 
preceded them, with their concepts, so-
cial practices, beliefs, language, knowl-
edge and values that already form part 
of the historical development of the com-
munity. It is thanks to the inherited con-
ceptual framework, that those born into 
that world, acquire the pre-supposed es-
tablished restrictions as to what the sub-
jects can come to believe. Among these 
pre-supposed concepts are the language, 
beliefs, knowledge, the norms and values 
that the subjects need to get to know their 
reality and interact with it. But although 
there is a reality that they encounter, it 
is also they, who as they go constructing 
in their social practices as members of 
a community, who can transform it and 
themselves in the process.
Although the members of a communi-
ty can structure a reality starting from 
different conceptual frameworks, the be-
liefs that they accept or reject, as well as 
the decisions and actions influenced by 
those beliefs, will be related to the group 
of elements (concepts, knowledge, be-
liefs, language, norms and values) that 
these subjects pre-suppose when making 
a choice (Olivé, 1999).
As Olivé explains, the importance of 
conceptual frameworks lies in that they 
can allow or prevent the identification 
of certain facts; they can also allow or 
prevent the formulation of certain prob-
lems, the recognition of certain facts as 
relevant to certain problems, as well as 
allowing or preventing the construction 
of theories and specific concepts about 
the world.  So that these conceptual 
frameworks can also allow or pose ob-
stacles for certain types of actions. These 
actions constitute the world in which we 
live (Olivé, 1996).
2.1. Internal Realism                                                                   
One of the main thesis of internal re-
alism by Putnam is that facts are con-
structs which are made based on concep-
tual frameworks, but also from a reality 
which is inferred as being independent 
of these frameworks.
From an opposite posture to internal 
realism, in metaphorical realism it is 
maintained that there is a realism struc-
tured by facts and objects that exist inde-
pendently from our conceptual frame-
works. From the posture of internal 
realism the facts and objects are consid-
ered not to have existed prior to the ap-
plication of the conceptual frameworks 
that we apply to an Independent Real-
ity (Olivé, 1996). We should understand 
that facts are situations in the world 
that certain subjects in relation to Real-
ity have constructed, are constructing or 
about to construct. As ‘object’ we should 
understand an entity that, as a result of 
the application of one of the conceptual 
frameworks to Reality, really exists in the 
world, has existed or will exist.
Taking as a basis the interpretation 
made by Olivé regarding internal re-
alism, in future we shall call reality or 
world (lower case) the reality or world 
that exists in relation to conceptual 
frameworks. This reality is not a mere 
reality of facts and objects conceived 
and known by the subjects. In a stronger 
sense, it is a reality of facts and objects 
that exist and are constructed in relation 
to one of the conceptual frameworks that 
divide independent Reality.
Another thing, Reality (capitalised) 
will be understood as independent Real-
ity where the subjects construct the facts 
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and objects by applying one of the con-
ceptual frameworks. About this Reality 
we cannot say anything, since our only 
access to this knowledge is through the 
conceptual frameworks.
Internal realism does not deny the ex-
istence of a Realism independent of our 
conceptual frameworks and the cognisant 
subjects, it maintains that the world does 
not exist independently of our concep-
tual frameworks. But this relationship 
between the reality of constructed facts 
within the conceptual frameworks and 
Reality from which facts are construct-
ed, should not be understood as dealing 
with two realities. The facts and the ob-
jects are real because they are part of 
independent Reality, they originate from 
there, but they are constructed as facts 
and objects in relation to the conceptu-
al frameworks. ‘reality’ (lower case) de-
pends gnostic-logically and onto-logically 
on these frameworks. Independent Real-
ity is inferred as a limit or restriction to 
our social constructs.
Therefore, according to internal real-
ism, the facts and objects that human be-
ings know, do not exist as of themselves, 
in the words of Putnam: “‘objects do not 
exist independently of the conceptual 
schemes.” (Putnam, 1981, p.52). So that 
internal realism sustains that a realist 
posture is not incompatible with concep-
tual relativity, “one can be both a realist 
and a conceptual relativist at the same 
time.” (Putnam, 1994, p. 61).
So, the experience we have of Reali-
ty is contaminated by our concepts, we 
cannot know anything of the first apart 
from the second. The world exists for us 
and we understand it only from a human 
point of view , “(…) ‘objects’ themselves 
are as much constructed as discovered, 
as much products of our conceptual in-
vention as the ‘objective’ factor in experi-
ence (…)”. (Putnam,1981, p.54)
Conceptual frameworks are not abso-
lute, nor fixed nor established definite-
ly, but rather human constructs that can 
change. The subjects of a community are 
not irremediably constricted to one sin-
gle conceptual framework but rather, 
the subjects can become related to oth-
er conceptual frameworks and discover 
that, as Sosa claims, “what exists in rela-
tion to one conceptual schema need not 
exist in relation to another.” (Sosa, 1992, 
p. 79). What we call world is as much a 
conceptual world as a real one “(…) we 
are not talking now of multiple possible 
alternatives to a single real world, but, on 
the contrary, of multiple real worlds (…)” 
(Goodman, 1990, p.18-19).
For internal realism facts and objects 
are constructed in relation to Reality ac-
cording to the interests and conceptual 
frameworks with which the subjects are 
familiar. As Olivé points out, when one 
applies a conceptual framework to Re-
ality a relevant context is established re-
garding which the properties of the facts 
and the objects are constructed, these 
properties will be those that determine 
the identity of these as the objects and 
facts that they are. In this sense that the 
objects and facts only exist in relation 
the conceptual frameworks. If Reality 
were not structured from the conceptual 
frameworks that allow the construction 
of relevant contexts, the facts and objects 
could not exist (Olivé, 1996). In the words 
of Sosa “(…) when we claim that there 
are certain things with certain proper-
ties, our statement should be considered 
as relative to a particular language and a 
conceptual scheme in particular.” (Sosa, 
1992, p.72).
From onto-epistemological pluralism 
as expressed here, we have no good rea-
son to affirm that the subjects have the 
knowledge to guarantee absolutely that 
our actions are completely right.  That 
which we consider epistemologically rel-
evant and that we accept as knowledge, 
we recognise as such because its impor-
tance and sense are embedded in our 
social practices, our knowledge, values, 
norms, beliefs, cultural ideals, political 
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and moral practices that we have inher-
ited from our predecessors and, partly, 
which have made us what we are.  So, 
according to onto-epistemological plural-
ism we understand that all knowledge is 
generated within the framework of some 
way of life, so that any knowledge is par-
tial and fallible. To acquire more precise 
knowledge, the cooperation between dif-
ferent groups of different disciplines, di-
verse cultures and institutions is neces-
sary.
By drawing an analogy between car-
tography and scientific knowledge, Philip 
Kitcher notes that even if the most up-to-
date maps often present a more precise 
spatial description and may include en-
tities that were previously omitted, tak-
ing as example, the American continent 
and Australia before they were discov-
ered, it cannot be claimed that any map 
is absolutely precise and it cannot be 
denied that a preliminary one may be 
more exact in its representations com-
pared to subsequent maps. The explorers 
of former times who reached their desti-
nations, had good reason to believe that 
the maps that guided them were correct. 
In retrospect, some of the features of the 
old maps were retained, in their later 
versions because part of that knowledge 
offered a better chance for the planned 
voyages to be successful. (Kitcher, 2001).
Maps are designed to meet certain 
different purposes and this makes them 
vary and also from one period to anoth-
er, however, we cannot say that they are 
the product of our conventions and wish-
es. In practice we can see that if a map is 
drawn to follow a certain route it is suf-
ficiently exact, and in this sense, it either 
serves the purpose for which it was in-
tended or it does not.  We could say that 
maps are designed according to wishes, 
beliefs, values, knowledge and the needs 
of the subjects.
Maps show what is relevant to one 
group of subjects, in this sense, cartogra-
phy is designed in relation to the context 
in which they live.  If we draw an analo-
gy, we find that the objectives of a certain 
piece of scientific research are not estab-
lished outside a certain way of life; they 
show what one group of researchers in 
particular consider to be of value accord-
ing to the social practices in which it is 
carried out.[2]
Dewey is right when he says that all re-
search takes place within a cultural con-
text constituted by social interactions.
If we look at earlier ages, it becomes 
evident that certain problems could not 
have arisen within the context of institu-
tions, customs, occupations and interests 
which did not exist at that time… There 
is an inalienable and indestructible fab-
ric of concepts which is not due to us but 
rather it has been given to us, ready-made 
by society, a whole apparatus of concepts 
and categories within which and with 
which individual thought is promoted, 
however daring and original it may be. 
(Dewey, 1950, p. 534)
Stebbing adds that “no thought, not 
even physical, is totally independent of 
the context of experience provided by 
society within which it works.”[3] Dewey 
continues: “And if this is true regarding 
the relationship of a certain physicist in 
the small society of scientists with whom 
he works, it is also true of the activities 
of the group, as a whole, they are deter-
mined in their main traits by the context 
of experience provided by the broadest 
contemporary society.” (p. 535)  For ex-
ample, it is impossible to separate the in-
terest there was in the 19th. Century in 
the exclusively mechanical concepts of 
Physics from the industrial needs of that 
time.
There is a diversity of languages from 
which one can conceptualize different 
objects, facts, processes, emotions, etc. 
There will be languages in which one 
type of knowledge can be expressed and 
in others it is impossible to express in the 
same way; including the different scien-
tific languages and scientific knowledge. 
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It may also be that in certain languages 
knowledge can be generated with great-
er precision.
That there are language alternatives 
to explain, for example, the balance of 
an ecosystem, means that there are dif-
ferent ways of knowing and describing 
what that balance is. Kitcher tells us: “In 
the way we try to describe, predict, ex-
plain nature we are inevitably selective.” 
(Kitcher, 2001, p. 46).
Giving an interpretation of the stabili-
ty of an ecosystem in our language means 
describing that process in relation to the 
practices and purposes that are valua-
ble in our way of life. The impact of the 
former constitutes and transforms our 
existential conditions. So that, according 
to the social practices of one group, will 
depend how its members see the world 
and what knowledge they will generate 
about it. For example, one group who 
consider the ecosystems to be sacred, will 
live in a different world, will know it and 
appreciate it in a different manner, and 
its members will develop different capac-
ities – v.gr., capacities for survival – from 
those who live in a city.
Starting from the idea that any knowl-
edge, including scientific knowledge, is 
formed in the practices of the subjects. 
Knowledge will depend on the way we 
form it in the context of practices of 
which we have no sure bases. These prac-
tices are epistemic (generators of knowl-
edge) but they also have an axiological 
structure.
The concepts we form and the knowl-
edge we develop are directed by a certain 
historical context which precedes us and, 
to a certain degree, conditions us to se-
lect specific objectives and projects, but 
not others, that concern us as we consid-
er them valuable. So that, any knowledge 
is contextually conditioned, is partial and 
is not neutral. “The possibility of a clean 
slate and a new start without prejudic-
es is undermined.” (Cartwright, 1996, 
p.131).
 
3. Entropy as a restriction to our 
actions
According to Christian Lévêque and 
Jean-Claude Mounolou biodiversity is not 
the result of a uniform process. Some spe-
cies have become extinct, of some others 
only a few descendants have survived 
under particular conditions, while some 
others have diversified considerably. Ac-
cording to these authors, in geographic 
terms, the distribution of biological di-
versity is the result of, on the one hand, 
climatic conditions and on the other, the 
way these have constituted and regulated 
the ecosystems. The future of biological 
diversity largely depends on these same 
factors but also on the human factor.
At present, human beings constitute 
an invasive species that modifies the en-
vironment on an unprecedented scale 
and threatens the biological heritage and 
the survival of numerous species, either 
directly or because they modify the con-
ditions of their existence. As a result, it is 
believed that we are experiencing a sixth 
period of massive extinction (Lévêque 
&Jean-Claude Mounolou,  2003).
While the environment is not subject-
ed to serious impact by human activity, its 
change is slow, which from a human per-
spective, could give the impression that 
the world which surrounds us is stable. 
However, biological diversity is in a state 
of perpetual evolution on time and space 
scales that do not necessarily coincide 
with those of humans and that need to be 
understood if we want to adopt adequate 
measures for its conservation. For exam-
ple, the Quaternary era that began less 
than two million years ago was marked 
by various ice ages and extreme climat-
ic variations. Scientists have been able 
to reconstruct with relative exactness an 
idea of the dynamics of the ecosystems 
and the biological diversity of this last 
cycle of the ice age as a function of cli-
mate changes over time (Idem). The hope 
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is that knowledge of the past will allow 
us to anticipate the future and direct our 
actions accordingly. The great problem 
is, even if it has been demonstrated that 
human activity has had an impact on the 
environment and species over time, nev-
er has it done so to the extent that it has 
through its technology in our days.
Jonas would say from the ethical ambit, 
the previous systems were above all an-
thropocentric, the object of human duty 
centered mainly on man himself, and 
although this still holds true as a linking 
force with the vulnerability of any living 
thing in face of the excessive interven-
tion by humans, according to this author, 
the object of our duty extends to the bio-
sphere of the planet with all its biodiver-
sity (Jonas, 1995). This means that now 
we are conscious that our conditions for 
existence include the biosphere.
To understand the size/dimension of 
the impact our actions have had on the 
planet let us remember what was said 
about the Second Law of Thermodynam-
ics, the quantity of entropy in the uni-
verse tends to increase over time. We un-
derstand that time is irreversible, and we 
experience it going in only one direction. 
If the process of entropy were reversible, 
then everything that has happened could 
be undone. Time goes forward because 
energy moves from one state where it 
is available to another where it is not. 
What entropy tells us about the direc-
tion of time, it does not tell us about the 
speed. With every event in the world en-
tropy increases, sometime more slowly, 
and sometimes faster. Entropy limits our 
actions, we cannot change the arrow of 
time, but it does depend on us how fast 
this process of entropy runs its course. 
That is to say, we decide how fast or slowly 
the available useful energy is dissipated. 
Oil, for example, is organic matter which 
took millions of years to form, today the 
consumption of this resource is so accel-
erated that it does not allow us to reach 
any stability between the consumption 
and its replacement. So intense is the use 
of oil that it becomes a non- renewable 
resource.
Since the survival of the human race 
depends on the availability of useful en-
ergy this means that every time we need 
more work to sustain human life. As there 
is not enough time in one day for human 
beings on their own to do the extra work 
necessary for survival under the difficult 
conditions of energy, new and complex 
technologies must be created to maintain 
human existence, and this has been so 
throughout History.
For example, the main source of ener-
gy in Mediaeval Europe was wood. When 
this resource became scarce they looked 
for alternatives until it was replaced 
by coal, which brought about a radical 
change in the way of organizing their 
lives in those days. The transition from 
wood to coal is considered to be one of 
the main factors leading to the Industrial 
Revolution.
To understand the magnitude of the 
energy crisis of those days it is important 
to understand the crucial role that wood 
played in everyday life at that time. Like 
the fossil fuels of today, wood was used 
for nearly everything.  A carpenter’s tools 
were made of wood, so were the pipes 
in the bathroom, the bucket, the broom 
and, in some parts of Europe, a poor 
man’s shoes were made of wood. Wood 
was used by farmers in agriculture and 
by textile workers; it was used for looms, 
spindles, oil presses, wine presses and, 
still a hundred years later, upon the in-
vention of the printing press which was 
made of wood.  The pipes which took wa-
ter to the cities were usually tree trunks; 
ships and the principal machines for in-
dustry were also made of wood. As raw 
material, tool, machinery, utensil, fuel 
and final product, wood was the domi-
nant resource of that time.
While cutting down the forests for ag-
riculture greatly reduced the amount of 
wood available for supply, it was the ac-
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celeration of commercial activities that 
led to a crisis in this industry. For exam-
ple, the new industries of glass and soap 
needed large quantities of wood ash. It 
was the production of iron (to smelt iron 
it is necessary to burn wood) and the con-
struction of ships that made the greatest 
demands.  At the end of the 16th centu-
ry and the beginning of the 17th centu-
ry the felling of trees was regulated, but 
this measure was not effective. In 1630 
the price of wood increased two and a 
half times compared to what it cost in the 
15th century.
The response to the wood crisis was 
coal. But, as was foreseeable, it was not 
just replacing one fuel resource with an-
other. The European cultures had consti-
tuted their ways of life closely related to 
wood. The change required a radical up-
heaval of a whole way of life, the way peo-
ple dressed, behaved, and were governed 
(Rifkin & Howard, 1980). The world was 
constituted from other pre-suppositions, 
from other conceptual frameworks in re-
lation to which there would be new and 
different facts and objects that did not ex-
ist previously.
Coal was treated as an inferior source 
of energy, it was dirty and it generated 
a lot of pollution. Also, it was more dif-
ficult to extract and process as energy 
than wood. According to Rifkin, the easi-
er sources of energy are used first. Then, 
each subsequent context was developed 
from a type of energy that was less easy 
to use than the one preceding it. It is 
more difficult to extract coal than it is to 
fell trees, more difficult to extract and 
process oil than coal and still more dif-
ficult to make nuclear energy available. 
Richard Wilkinson in his book Poverty 
and Progress says:
“During the course of economic devel-
opment man has been forced again and 
again to change the resources he depends 
on and the methods for exploiting them … 
gradually he has been involved in more 
and more complicated processing and 
production techniques …. Economic devel-
opment, understood in its broadest sense, 
is the development of ever more intense 
(and complicated) forms of exploiting the 
environment.” (p. 75)
In this close relationship with the 
changes in our surroundings and the en-
ergy resources available, technological 
changes occur. For instance, the steam 
engine was designed as a technological 
and scientific response to the problems 
for extracting coal; the steam pump 
drained water from the mines. This was 
only one of the various innovations com-
ing directly from the new energy con-
text. The problem of extracting coal was 
solved and then there was the problem 
of how to transport it to the markets 
throughout England. Because of its vol-
ume, coal could not be moved easily by 
horse drawn wagons. Most of the roads in 
England were not paved, with the crisis 
of farm land, using horses, who had to be 
fed, for transport was too expensive. The 
answer to this problem was the steam lo-
comotive and the railways. Just like the 
steam pump, the steam locomotive was 
a direct response to the needs that arose 
from the use of coal as the main source of 
energy, and this in turn set the bases for 
the industrial era, increasing the com-
plexity of the interactions between hu-
man beings and their environment.
It is common to believe that the idea 
of cultural progress corresponds to the 
increased use of new technologies; it is 
often considered that the more advanced 
the technology, the more advanced will 
be the progress of a civilization. Howev-
er, the use of new technologies does not 
necessarily mean a reduction in work, 
a reduction in the use of available ener-
gy, on the contrary, on many occasions 
the new technologies increase the speed 
with which energy is extracted, also in-
creasing the flow and therefore dissipat-
ing more energy.
Throughout history there have been 
cultures that have survived long peri-
ods of time adapting themselves to the 
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environment and they have managed 
to live in a stationary state in which the 
production of entropy was minimum. If 
we continue with the idea that techno-
logical innovation is necessary without 
considering the availability of resources, 
we will reach a moment in which we will 
find ourselves at a critical point when 
those resources have run out. Another 
thing, history shows that each technolog-
ical innovation, since the first, presents 
certain secondary unforeseeable effects 
that turn out to be more damaging than 
those that would have been caused by 
the lack of energy (Ellul, 1964).
At present, the scientific process devel-
ops in an interrelation with technology. 
In order to reach its objectives science 
needs technology to be ever more pow-
erful and precise. These scientific-tech-
nological processes take place in a con-
text which is social, cultural, economic 
and political; these constitute our lives 
and they transform them. The idea that 
scientific-technological research and the 
products derived from it are separate 
from our existential conditions is a falla-
cy which encourages the irresponsibility 
of those involved, regarding the conse-
quences of their actions.
According to William James, the no-
tion of truth is linked to the concrete con-
sequences that take place in our lives. 
For James, truth means accordance with 
reality and falseness is when it does not 
agree, which means that our beliefs and 
practices far from posing obstacles, are 
exact, they should flow with that reality 
while being restricted by it. Something 
is true if it functions, and this ‘function-
ality’ is understood in relation to a con-
text where concrete men and women live 
the effects of decisions taken by others. 
For example, let us think of trans-genic 
maize. How a product of techno-scientif-
ic research brought about a genetically 
modified plant is a fact. In this narrow 
sense the proposition “The creation of 
transgenic maize is a success” is true, cer-
tainly the project of creating genetically 
modified maize plants has been a suc-
cess.  Even if the proposition is true, it is 
not functional in the broader sense that 
James and Dewey defend, because of the 
concrete consequences in life, transgen-
ic maize is far from being a success. The 
error is to think that the techno-scientif-
ic achievement of transgenic maize is a 
success that is under control by the re-
searches apart from the consequences in 
specific contexts. The idea of modernity 
according to which man controls nature 
is a fallacy and the paradox is exposed 
through bio-technological research. Re-
searchers carry out this type of process 
directly on living beings, and they depend 
on the complexity of these organisms but 
they are unable to control the effects that 
follow after their manipulation, which 
announces the end of modernity.
These days, one of the principal risks is 
that man, by using his technology on na-
ture, transforms the conditions of exist-
ence irreversibly, so that there is no pos-
sible way to re-evaluate nor to reverse 
completed actions.
Hans Jonas (Jonas, 1995) explains 
that up to now technology had used in-
animate matter with which he created 
auxiliaries for human use. The division 
seemed clear: man was the subject and 
‘nature’ the object of technical dominion. 
This has been, by definition the preten-
sion to modernity. With the arrival of 
bio-technology, whose objectives are to 
transform structures which continue to 
be original creations of nature, the cen-
tral idea of modernity according to which 
man dominates nature, paradoxically 
is undermined. When scientists insert a 
new determinant in a live organism, they 
collaborate with the organism’s own ac-
tivity, its biological system that functions 
according to its specific nature.  The in-
tegration of the determinant depends 
on the system itself, which can accept or 
reject what it has been given. This is of 
great relevance for a possible prediction 
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of the consequences because not all the 
results possible that can ensue can be en-
visioned or controlled by the researcher. 
Scientists aim at controlling the live or-
ganisms they work with, but they real-
ly cannot foresee all the possible effects 
that might ensue. The developments in 
biotechnology require that the research-
ers control the overwhelming complexity 
of the elements and processes belonging 
to the organisms they experiment with, 
which is evidently impossible. To a cer-
tain degree the plan becomes a wager 
where the transformation of an organism 
is no more than an experiment that takes 
so long to develop that the final result 
is further away than the researcher can 
foresee. These experiments (let us take 
genetic manipulation) cannot be carried 
out with representative models; so that 
the attempt can be valid it has necessar-
ily to be done on a live organism. When 
the effects of this experiment become 
visible it is too late to correct what has 
already been done.
Conclusions
From the epistemological posture / 
perspective that we have presented, in 
this work we have sustained the follow-
ing thesis:
– That as subjects we constitute the 
world we live in through one of the pos-
sible conceptual frameworks.
– Our cognitive and social practices 
construct the world in a certain manner, 
which makes us responsible for the way 
this world is constituted.
The type of scientific and technological 
practices that cannot be corrected force 
us to consider that the ends/ objectives 
are definitive, since in fact, once started 
there is no going back. This, leads us to 
reflect that the advance of technology 
and its power is too advanced in relation 
to the knowledge that men have and also 
to their moral capacity to make the cor-
rect decisions keeping in mind the con-
ditions that future generations will live 
in. The risk is that human beings cannot 
know for certain what the bi-products/ 
sub-products of scientific-technologi-
cal-research will be, they cannot foresee 
exactly what the consequences derived 
from it will be.
Without the perspective that time 
gives us, on many occasions it is not clear 
if the effects are negative or not.  It may 
also be that the consequences turn out to 
be what was expected according to the 
scientific and technological objectives 
as envisioned. In this sense, they may be 
successful, but in the social, cultural and 
moral contexts the results may be con-
fusing, if not harmful, and exceed the ca-
pacity for research, deliberation and de-
cision making by the members of society.
Therefore, the acquisition of knowl-
edge has become an urgent duty, but, see-
ing that the products of research remain 
submitted to the restrictions imposed 
by reality, in this case,  conceptualized 
as entropy, it is necessary to accept that 
far from the subjects having absolute 
dominion over the environment, the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics restricts our 
practices.
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